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ABSTRACT 
 
The costs and benefits of harmonization of international accounting and disclosure 
practices by firms is an important policy issue. This paper investigates the extent to 
which voluntary disclosure practices by Japanese firms have converged since the collapse 
of Japan’s financial ‘bubble’ of the late 1980’s.  Convergence of voluntary disclosure 
would suggest that Japanese firms respond to environmental and market pressures by 
adopting increasingly similar reporting practices.  Our findings suggest that, for our 
sample of Japanese firms, there was neither more, nor less, convergence in selected 
voluntary disclosure practices over the sample period, although the average level of 
disclosure did increase.  The results suggest that Japanese firms were in “equilibrium” in 
terms of the scope of information they voluntarily disclosed, although they perceived net 
benefits in increasing the quantity of disclosed information.   3
INTRODUCTION 
  The formation of an International Accounting Standards Committee, renamed the 
International Accounting Standards Board, to pursue the goal of creating a single set of 
accounting principles to be used around the world is premised, in part, upon a belief that 
there will be large cost savings from doing away with the need for companies to prepare 
heterogeneous financial statements in order to satisfy different regulatory standards. As 
well, by enabling foreign firms meeting the international standards to raise capital in 
financial markets of the signatory countries, an international accounting standard will 
help contribute to the integration of national capital markets. The latter, in turn, should 
help promote increased competition in regional and national capital markets with 
associated increases in efficiency. Many of the world’s financial regulators, accounting 
standard setters, users and preparers have voiced support for a single set of higher quality 
global accounting standards (Street, 2002). 
 
  At the same time, harmonization will obviously involve compromise such that the 
agreed-upon international standard might be “second-best” from the strict perspective of 
any single regulatory regime.TP
1
PT Specifically, the information priorities of users of financial 
accounting information are likely to differ across national and regional markets.TP
2
PT Thus, if 
one were designing an “optimal” disclosure regime for, say, Japan, it might differ 
significantly from an optimal disclosure regime for the United Kingdom both because of 
national differences in the perceived net benefits of different disclosure items, as well as 
differences across countries in industrial structure.TP
3
PT  Hence, a disclosure regime designed 
to appeal to the “median international user” will inevitably reflect compromises. Given 
relatively heterogeneous priorities across different sets of investors, it is certainly 
possible that a standardized disclosure regime, if implemented, would have greater 




The costs of disclosure include direct expenditures associated with data 
collection, processing, production and auditing, and indirect costs, including the 
provision of useful information to competitors (Gray, Radebaugh and Roberts, 1990). 
The inadvertent transfer of commercially valuable information to competitors, along with   4
the associated transfers of wealth might discourage innovation on the part of affected 
firms.  This could constitute a relatively large social cost associated with mandatory 
harmonization of accounting standard depending upon the mandated disclosure 
requirements. Harmonizing domestic accounting practices with foreign accounting 
practices might also have deleterious effects on domestic price informativeness and 
securities trading volumes (Rahman, Perera and Ganesh, 2002). In the limit, firms may 
simply not comply with international disclosure requirements (Street and Gray, 2002). 
 
As a practical matter, it is impossible to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of 
the social benefits and costs of accounting harmonization.  In this context, a potentially 
useful piece of information to policymakers is the extent to which management of 
different companies perceive growing net private benefits to voluntary harmonization.  
To the extent that harmonization of accounting practices is characterized by larger private 
benefits an/or lower private costs, regulatory initiatives to promote accounting 
harmonization are more likely to enjoy positive net social benefits. 
 
  A number of studies have examined the extent to which accounting regulations 
and/or professional accounting standards across countries have become more or less 
similar over time.TP
5
PT Findings of increased similarity have led some observers to conclude 
that accounting practices possess characteristics that are universally applicable, and that 
the efforts of supranational agencies to promote the harmonization of international 
disclosure practices are likely to be welfare enhancing.TP
6
PT However, this view implicitly 
presumes that regulatory authorities are effectively acting in the interest of users of 
corporate information whose increasingly similar demands for information are not being 
satisfied by companies. In fact, increased similarities across de jure disclosure regimes do 
not necessarily signal increased similarities in disclosure priorities of companies 
operating within and across those regimes. That is, while priorities of national policy 
makers may actually be converging, perhaps driven, in turn, by the actions of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee, the priorities of users of corporate 
information may actually be diverging, or (at best) not becoming more uniform. 
   5
  In short, arguments for regulatory harmonization of disclosure practices rest 
heavily upon the notion that constituents for corporate information have increasingly 
uniform demands for information, and that corporations, for one reason or another, are 
not meeting those demands through voluntary disclosures in a timely fashion. In fact, 
there is virtually no research bearing upon this issue. Most available studies focus on the 
convergence or divergence of disclosure standards as promulgated by regulators or 
accounting standards boards. Others consider the extent to which firms respond in similar 
or different fashions to changes in regulations or standards or to common influences such 
as US GAAP.TP
7
PT Virtually no studies examine the extent to which firms within or across 
regulatory jurisdictions are voluntarily implementing similar accounting disclosure 
practices over time, independent of legal and “quasi-legal” pressures to do so.TP
8
PT One 
exception is Rahman, Perera and Ganeshanandam (2002) who examine the similarity in 
reported mandated and non-mandated disclosure and measurement items across samples 
of Australian and New Zealand companies. The authors find that harmonized (across 
countries) disclosure regulation is positively related to disclosure practice harmonization. 
However, disclosure practice harmonization also depends upon a number of firm-level 
characteristics, and some categories of disclosure and measurement have more and others 
less harmonization.  
 
  An inference that might be drawn from the Rahman, Perera and Ganeshanandam 
(2002) study is that the association between regulatory harmonization and practice 
harmonization is imperfect. In particular, firm characteristics condition desired disclosure 
practices, and these characteristics differ across firms. Hence, regulatory efforts to 
develop and implement uniform disclosure practices might well impose costs of various 
types described above upon companies affected with less than compensatory benefits for 
those companies. In this context, the net social benefits of regulated uniform disclosure 
become more suspect. 
 
  The purpose of this study is to embellish the findings of Rahman, Perera and 
Ganeshanandam (2002) by providing evidence on the extent to which Japanese 
companies are becoming more or less similar over time in their voluntary reporting of   6
accounting information. Companies within a country or region are likely to face a more 
similar set of environmental factors conditioning the “optimal” disclosure regime than 
will companies from different countries. As such, if constituents for corporate 
information become more similar over time in their information priorities, one would 
expect to see greater uniformity in voluntary corporate disclosure practices over time 
within a sample of relatively homogenous companies. Failing to observe greater 
uniformity in voluntary disclosure practices across a fairly similar set of companies 
would cast doubt upon the hypothesis that investors and lenders are becoming 
increasingly similar in their information requirements on a worldwide basis, thereby 
accentuating concerns about high provate costs relative to benefits being imposed on 
companies affected by mandated accounting practices.  
 
The behavior of Japanese companies can therefore be seen as a case study of 
changing uniformity of disclosure practices in the private sector. While it is clearly 
dangerous to generalize from the behavior of participants in a single country, Japan 
arguably represents an informative “laboratory” for our policy focus. It has been 
documented that increased competition for financial capital encourages increased 
voluntary financial disclosure on the part of companies, including Japanese companies.TP
9
PT 
Japanese companies arguably faced substantially enhanced pressures to raise financial 
capital outside of their Keiretsu organizations in the 1990s.TP
10
PT To this extent, if lenders and 
investors are becoming increasingly similar in their information priorities, one might 
expect increased competitive pressures in external capital markets to encourage Japanese 
companies to become more similar in their disclosure practices even without pressure to 
do so from regulators. 
 
  In short, to the extent that Japanese companies became increasingly similar over 
time in their voluntary disclosure practices, our case study would offer some indirect 
support for the claim that environmental factors are encouraging greater homogeneity in 
the information priorities of corporate constituents. On the other hand, if Japanese 
companies did not become more similar in their voluntary disclosure practices, it would 
raise serious questions about whether environmental forces are contributing to greater   7
homogeneity of information demands on an international basis. In fact, we find that 
Japanese companies became neither more, nor less, similar in their disclosure practices 
over our sample period, although they did, on average, increase the level of their 
disclosure over that period. 
 
  Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the concepts of voluntary 
disclosure and harmonization of disclosure practice and applies those concepts to our 
study. Section 3 describes our samples of Japanese companies and the procedures used to 
identify changes in disclosure practices over time. Various measures of disclosure 
practices are described and analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 contains a summary and 
conclusions. 
 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND HARMONIZATION 
  As noted above, there is a fairly substantial literature dealing with similarities and 
dissimilarities in disclosure practices across accounting regimes. In broad terms, the 
available studies distinguish between similarities and differences across regulatory 
regimes and those across different companies.TP
11
PT In the former, increased similarity of 
disclosure rules and recommendations, or harmonization of rules and recommendations, 
is the outcome of initiatives implemented by financial regulators and/or accounting 
standards boards. That is, it represents a convergence of recommended or desired 
outcomes as promulgated by regulators, standards boards and the like. The focus of the 
latter is similarities and differences in actual disclosure practices of companies. Clearly, 
one would expect the actual disclosure practices of companies to be influenced by the 
rules and recommendations of regulators and boards, since the failure to implement 
formally recommended disclosure practices could have adverse financial consequences 
for many companies. Indeed, Rahman, Perera and Ganeshanandam (1996) note that the 
harmonization of accounting rules and standards is a primary factor driving greater 
uniformity in disclosure behavior across companies. 
 
For our purposes, to the extent that changes in corporate disclosure are directly or 
indirectly motivated by changes in formal accounting rules and recommendations, they   8
are not “truly voluntary.” Rather, truly voluntary changes in disclosure arise from 
changes in market forces with the influence of regulation held constant. In this regard, 
our taxonomy is similar to that of Parker and Morris (2001). They distinguish between 
formal, material, and spontaneous harmonization. Formal harmonization is the 
harmonization of regulation; material harmonization refers to accounting practices as 
influenced by regulations or market forces; and spontaneous harmonization arises from 
market forces and not from regulations. 
 
The distinction between the various concepts and their relation to our empirical 
analysis can be further explained through the following conceptual framework. Assume 
that there are two companies, Company A and Company B, operating under two 
regulatory regimes, RB1
B and RB2
B. In addition, assume that given current economic 
conditions and existing regulatory rules and recommendations, Company A is currently 
disclosing a set of discrete items of information denoted by the vector (VBa
B), while 
Company B is disclosing a discrete set of information items denoted by the vector (VBb
B). 
The VBa










B For purposes of simplicity, we assume that the two vectors are completely 
orthogonal. That is, there is no element in VBa
B that is also in VBb
B and vice-versa. Put simply, 
the disclosure practices of the two companies are completely dissimilar. Presumably the 
two regulatory regimes are also dissimilar. 
 
Now assume a change occurs in RB1
B such that the regulator implements specific 
rules that had been implemented in RB2
B in an earlier period. Further assume that the rules 
have the effect of requiring Company A to report item bB1
B, and that bB2
B can be reported for 
essentially no incremental cost once the company has incurred the costs of disclosing bB1.
B 
As a result, aB1
B now equals bB1
B and aB2
B now equals bB2
B. The net result is that the disclosure 
practices of the two companies would become more similar. However, in our frame of 
reference, the increased disclosure of Company A is not voluntary. Rather, in the 
terminology of Parker and Morris (2001), it reflects material harmonization. 
Alternatively, assume that RB1
B is not changed but element aBm
B is changed so that it is 
identical to bBm
B. Presumably, some change in the marketplace made it profitable for   9
Company A to change its disclosure practice to make it more similar to that of Company 
B. We consider the latter change to be voluntary.TP
12
PT While the change could be motivated 
by any one of several factors, one plausible explanation is that investors increasingly 
believe that the information supplied by item bBm
B has more value to them than the 
information supplied by item aBm
B. Equivalently, the marketplace change effectively 
involves constituents of Company A becoming more similar to those of Company B, at 
least in terms of their information priorities. 
 
While the preceding examples described changes in existing elements of VBa
B, we 
could also have created changes in VBa
B by adding new elements. To the extent that at least 
some of the new elements were identical to elements in VBb
B, the two vectors would 
become more similar. Furthermore, if the added elements were not directly or indirectly 
related to changes in RB1
B, we would identify the increased similarity as reflecting 
voluntary initiatives by Company A. Equally, Company B could add disclosure items that 
are equivalent to some elements in VBa
B. 
 
In the preceding examples, the concept of increased similarity, or greater 
uniformity, is obvious, since the two vectors are initially assumed to have no elements in 
common. The concept is less obvious when there are some common elements to start 
with and then both similar and dissimilar elements are added to the two vectors. In this 
latter case, more formal statistical measures of correspondence among the elements of the 
vectors are appropriate. Nevertheless, the conceptual underpinning of the analysis 
remains the same. Namely, increased similarity between the vectors that are unrelated to 
changes in regulatory regimes may be taken to reflect market-driven changes in 
disclosure environments that have the effect of encouraging increased similarity in 
disclosure behavior on the part of companies operating in those environments. 
 
An obvious challenge to an analysis of voluntary disclosure is to identify a time 
period and regulatory regime where changes in a set of disclosure items cannot be 
plausibly linked, directly or indirectly, to changes in the de jure regulatory regime. We 
believe that over the time period of our sample, changes in the disclosure practices of   10
Japanese companies, as measured by our disclosure instrument, were primarily voluntary, 
in  that they were not obviously motivated by changes in formal regulatory requirements 
or by recommendations of accounting standards boards. Specifically, we investigated 
whether any material changes in de jure disclosure rules or regulations occurred in Japan 
that might have contributed to a significant movement toward greater uniformity of 
disclosure across firms as reflected in our disclosure instrument.  
 
Although there were de jure changes in the Japanese accounting regime during 
the sample period, they were related to measurement practice rather than disclosure.TP
13
PT We 
were unable to identify any changes that should have altered incentives to respond to our 
disclosure instrument in any specific way over our sample time period.  As an example, 
significant regulatory changes in accounting for marketable securities, pensions, and 
consolidation of subsidy companies were imposed on Japanese firms, effective in the late 
1990s.  While these changes were beyond our sample period, they might have stimulated 
voluntary changes within our sample period to the extent that the changes were 
anticipated by our sample firms. Although the accounting environment changes as a 
result of the new rules, the measure of voluntary disclosure in the Botosan instrument 
would be largely unaffected.  The changes focused more on measurement of income and 
would not be reflected in the disclosure instrument. In this sense, greater or lesser 
uniformity in disclosure across firms in our sample can be taken to reflect voluntary 
changes.  
 
Changes in the disclosure behavior of our sample of Japanese companies are also 
voluntary in a broader sense in that our disclosure measures are based upon English-
language versions of those companies’ Japanese-language annual reports. Campbell 
(1985) calls these “convenience translations” which may include additional disclosure 
items that are not required by Japanese GAAP and which may reclassify some financial 
information into a form that is more familiar to non-Japanese readers. As such, 
convenience translations should be influenced by capital market conditions outside as 
well as inside Japan. While such translations may not provide a perfectly accurate picture 
of financial reporting in Japanese, there is no reason to believe that changes in disclosure   11
practices over time in convenience translations offer a misleading overall picture of 
increased or decreased harmonization of financial reporting in the Japanese language. 
 
  In summary, actual corporate disclosure becomes more uniform when companies 
make increasingly similar choices among disclosure alternatives (VanDer Tas, 1992). 
Obviously, this can take place against the background of increased or decreased absolute 
levels of disclosure on the part of those companies. Some observers argue that increased 
similarities in disclosure practices that reflect firms reporting less information in a more 
similar manner is a meaningless indicator of harmonization from a public policy 
perspective.TP
14
PT In fact, this criticism does not apply to our study, since disclosure levels, 
on average, increased over our sample time period for our sample companies. Hence, any 
harmonization that is observed is concomitant with increased overall disclosure. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
  Two specific time periods were selected to investigate the convergence or lack of 
convergence in disclosure practices among Japanese firms. The first period, 1987-1993, 
can be characterized as the “Bubble” economy that reflects relatively high economic and 
financial asset growth rates compared to the latter part of the 1990s, as well as relatively 
abundant domestic sources of financial capital. By contrast, a major recession and 
economic restructuring marks our second time period, 1996-1998.TP
15
PT During the latter 
period, Japanese firms faced increasingly competitive global product markets, while a 
domestic banking crisis forced many firms to seek capital outside of Japan. Since this 
crisis has continued to the present time, it is reasonable to presume that Japanese firms 




  The two time periods selected therefore reflect two distinctively different 
economic environments faced by Japanese companies, although the trend over the entire 
period was arguably one of Japanese companies facing stronger incentives to integrate 
into global financial markets, as well as to improve sales in foreign markets. To the 
extent that increased disclosure improves access to foreign capital, the incentives of 
Japanese companies to disclose information voluntarily over the 1990s could be expected   12
to increase. Furthermore, to the extent that potential investors and lenders have 
increasingly similar information priorities, regardless of differences in specific investing 
and lending opportunities, voluntary disclosure practices could be expected to exhibit 
greater uniformity over the period of the 1990s. 
 
  Data were collected for one year for each sample time period. The specific years 
selected were 1989 (for the Bubble period) and 1998 (for the Current period). This time 
period is sufficiently long so that any trend in disclosure behavior should be evident. 
When annual reports for specific companies were not available for the specific year, the 
next closest preceding year was used, with 1987 as a cut-off year. Given the time 
consuming and costly nature of the data collection process, it was not feasible to collect 
disclosure information for all years between 1989 and 1998. In choosing specific years 
that essentially bracket the entire period, our assumption is that changes in disclosure are 
not reversible and proceed relatively deliberately, such that observed changes between 
discontinuous years do not mask significant (and possibly contradictory) unobserved 
changes between non-sample years.TP
17
PT While it is possible that averaging disclosure values 
for two or more years of any sub-period might reduce purely transitory variations in 
“equilibrium” disclosure behavior, the individual years chosen for this study are arguably 
sufficiently separated in time so as to capture meaningful changes in disclosure behavior 
over the decade of the 1990s. 
 
Disclosure Instruments and Scores 
  Various methods have been used in the literature to measure the extent of a firm’s 
disclosure.TP
18
PT For purposes of this study, the disclosure index developed by Botosan 
(1997) is used. It was chosen principally because the measurement categories more 
closely reflect voluntary disclosure behavior for the sample firms of this study than do the 
instruments in other studies. For example, the focus of the questionnaire is on voluntarily 
disclosed information with high predictive value as opposed to disclosure of various 
historical accounting issues for regulatory purposes. Since a large number of the 
disclosure questions were unrelated to accounting disclosures, per se, the instrument is 
less susceptible to potential bias resulting from changes in the de jure regulatory regime.    13
In addition to the focus on voluntary disclosure, the instrument’s reliability and validity 
disclosure is the most rigorously tested of those cited in the literature. A copy of the 
instrument used to measure the disclosure score for each firm is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
  Two specific potential concerns with the use of the Botosan index might be 
briefly mentioned. One is that the index was designed specifically for U.S. companies, 
and it is therefore inappropriate to apply the index to a sample of Japanese companies. In 
fact, if the primary pressures influencing disclosure behavior are emanating from a 
growing need to acquire financial capital in international capital markets, the use of a 
disclosure instrument that reflects the priorities of international investors and lenders 
seems appropriate. A second concern is that the Botosan index is not a comprehensive 
description of the disclosure behavior of our sample companies. Specifically, some 
disclosed information may not be identified by the index. If changes in the unidentified 
disclosure items are dissimilar to changes inferred from Botosan’s index, inappropriate 
conclusions might be drawn from an analysis based solely upon Botosan’s index. 
However, there is no reason to believe that the disclosure items from the Botosan index 
are idiosyncratic or unrepresentative of a broader range of disclosure behavior.  
 
  The major components of the index are classified into the following five 
categories: background information, ten- or five-year summary of historical results, key 
non-financial statistics, projected information and management discussion and analysis of 
operations. The different categories of information reflect the proposition that different 
types of information are disclosed for different reasons (Gray, Meek & Roberts, 1995). 
Each category contains specific questions that represent management’s voluntary 
disclosure of information for the given category.  Disclosure requirements initiated 
during the sample period by regulatory authorities were reviewed to insure that they were 
not included as voluntary disclosure questions in the instrument. 
 
  Specific disclosure questions can be scored on a quantitative or qualitative basis. 
Points for each individual firm (j) are awarded for specific disclosure items within each 
category (i) for a given sample year (t). Each category (i) has a score based on the   14
number of items within the category. A category disclosure score (DISCBijt
B) measures the 
total points awarded for disclosure for a given category (i) for firm (j) for time period (t). 
The maximum disclosure score for each category is: 
  Background Information                                                26 points 
           Ten or Five Year Summary of Historical Results            7 points 
            Key Non-financial Statistics                                           40 points 
            Projected Information                                                     28 points 
            Management Discussion and Analysis of Results          26 points 
                                                                                                     
  Total Possible Disclosure Points (Score)                      127 points 
 
A total disclosure score measures the total points awarded for disclosure by the jth firm in 
time period (t) for all categories.TP
19
PT The maximum DISC score using this instrument is 
127- the total number of disclosure items.  
 
  The disclosure index score is based upon information in each firm’s annual report 
to shareholders. Although the annual report is not the only source or means of disclosure, 
as noted by Knutson (1992), it is typically the most important source of information for 
most analysts. In addition, Lang and Lundholm (1993) noted a high, positive correlation 
between annual report disclosure and disclosure in other sources (such as press releases 
or regulatory filings). The annual reports for our sample of firms are the English language 
version for each firm. It could be argued that the English language version of Japanese 
firms’ annual reports would fail to capture disclosure effects unique to the Japanese 
business environment.  However, the purpose and scope of our paper is the response of 
Japanese firms to the global marketplace. Hence, this criticism is inappropriate. 
 
  The annual reports for each sample firm were obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Each annual report was analyzed and assigned points by one of the authors. 
The same author assigned scores for all firms to ensure consistency. The scores from 
each annual report constituted the Disclosure Score (DISC) for each firm in each sample 
year.TP
20
PT   15
 
Sample Firms 
  Our sample firms were randomly selected from a stratified sample of firms in the 
Nikkei 225 Index. The Nikkei Index includes 225 of the major firms listed on the “first 
section” of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We excluded firms in industries that are highly 
regulated, for example, banking, insurance and securities, since their levels of disclosure 
will be primarily conditioned by regulatory practices. We also excluded service-related 
firms that are less likely than their manufacturing counterparts to compete in international 
input and output markets, and may, as a result, be less integrated into international 
financial markets. The sample firms are therefore drawn primarily from manufacturing-
related industries that share relatively similar disclosure environments. 
 
 Two initial samples were created. Their characteristics are summarized at Table 
1, and they encompass 109 firms for 1998 and 48 for 1989. While there is some overlap 
in the identities of firms in the two samples, they are obviously heterogeneous samples, 
and they are referred to in this way. These sample sizes are comparable to those used in 
other disclosure studies.TP
21
PT  Since these samples are not identical in terms of the identities 
of the included firms, changes in the calculated disclosure indices over time may reflect 
changes in the composition of firms across the samples, rather than the “uniform” 
influence on firms of capital market pressures to harmonize disclosure behavior. In this 
context, two procedures are adopted to address this potential problem. In one procedure, 
we isolate a sample of 41 firms that are part of both the beginning and end period 
samples. We refer to this as our homogeneous sample. By focusing on changes in 
disclosure practices among these 41 firms, we eliminate the potential for sample results to 
reflect changes in the identities of sample firms. We describe and discuss this sample 
below. 
 
In a second procedure, we assess whether and how changes in the number and the 
identities of firms in our two time period samples might influence measured disclosure 
behavior.  We do this by company, two groups of firms:  48 in the first  time period and  
69 in the second time period.  We call this our heterogeneous sample.TP
22
PT   16
 
Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) identify three factors that are statistically 
significant determinants of voluntary disclosure: company size, country/region of origin 
and international listing status.TP
23
PT Industry effects are also present, although they are not as 
statistically robust as the previously mentioned factors.TP
24
PT Hence, if factors such as size 
and international listing status became more homogeneous across our samples of firms 
over the sample period, we could expect to observe harmonization of disclosure practices 
independent of any influences from “exogenous” factors in the external environment.TP
25
PT 
On the other hand, if there was no convergence or divergence across sample firms in the 
main factors influencing disclosure, particularly firm size, international listing status and 
industrial classification, there would be reason to believe that our heterogeneous sample 
was biased for or against identifying increased uniformity of disclosure over time. 
 
Our sample of heterogeneous firms was employed in order to increase the number 
of data points and, hence, the robustness of our empirical analysis. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the firms are not identical in the two sample periods, we were able to determine 
that the industrial composition of the heterogeneous sample is constant over the sample 
time period.TP
26
PT  As well, no changes in the distribution of international listing status 
occurred between the two sample years. Specifically, the proportion of internationally 
listed companies was not significantly different between the two sample years. Constancy 
of the statistical distributions of industrial classification and listing status also apply to 
our sample of 41 firms. Hence, changes in the size distributions of firms over time are the 
main potential confounding factor in attempting to identify changes in the uniformity of 
firm-level disclosure in either the sample of 41 firms whose identities are constant over 
the time period, or our larger sample containing firms of changing identities.. 
 
It must be acknowledged that changes in other firm-specific factors might also 
influence disclosure behavior, on the margin. These factors include profitability, debt-to-
equity ratios, membership in a keiretsu and the degree of “multinationality” of the firm.TP
27
PT  
There is no reason to believe that debt-to-equity ratios should systematically converge or 
diverge in either the “sample of 41” or the heterogeneous sample, since capital structure   17
tends to be related to industry classification, which is constant in both samples, as noted 
above. The multinationality of a company is strongly related to firm size (Dunning, 
1993). Since the distributions of firm size may well vary over our sample time period, it 
is again advisable to evaluate whether changes in firm size distributions might be 
influencing observed changes in disclosure behavior, and we do so below. However, it 
must be acknowledged that results for our broad sample of firms may reflect changes 
over time in the distribution across firms of factors that we have not explicitly evaluated, 
most notably profitability and capital structure. 
 
DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOR 
  Mean disclosure scores, standard deviations and coefficients of variation for total 
disclosure and for each specific information category are presented in Table 2 for the 
sample of 41 identical companies and in Table 3 for the heterogeneous sample. The 
results indicate that mean voluntary disclosure increased in every specific disclosure 
category for both samples of firms. Increases in mean disclosure scores are statistically 
significant for all information categories, except for “non-financial statistics” and 
“management discussion” in the case of the homogeneous sample. Results for the 
heterogeneous sample are similar with differences in the average disclosure scores for the 
non-financial statistics and summary information categories being statistically 
insignificant. The difference in the total disclosure index is statistically significant in both 
the homogeneous sample and the heterogeneous sample. Significant increases in the 
disclosure of some categories of information, but not of others, suggest that firms place 
different degrees of emphasis and importance on the disclosure of specific types of 
information.TP
28
PT   
 
  Differences in the mean levels of disclosure do not equate to greater uniformity in 
the disclosure of information by firms. Greater uniformity of disclosure would be 
indicated by greater similarities (or fewer differences) in disclosurepreferences on the 
part of international companies.  A number of statistical measures of harmonization are 
discussed in the literature, most notably the Herfindahl index. (Parker and Morris, 2001).  
A relatively simple way of testing for greater similarity of disclosure over the two sample   18
periods is to compare the variance in disclosure across the samples of firms for the two 
periods. A reduction in variance over time would be consistent with more similar 
disclosure practices. That is, an increase in mean disclosure combined with reduced 
variance in disclosure would indicate that our sample firms are voluntarily reporting more 
information, and that the information reported is increasingly similar. This methodology 
is similar to that used by Makhtari and Rassekh (1989) in their analysis of factor price 
convergence, except that they employed continuous time series data, whereas we use two 
discrete time periods. 
 
  We use the coefficient of variation (CV), a scale neutral measure of variation, to 
describe the extent of variation in voluntary disclosure over the sample firms in each time 
period. Specifically, CV values are calculated for each category of disclosure for both the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous samples. The results are reported in Table 4. A 
significant reduction in CV values when comparing the second sample period to the first 
would indicate a decrease in the variance of disclosure practice for the specific 
information category. That is, it would indicate that sample firms became more similar in 
their disclosure behavior over time while increasing their overall level of disclosure. 
Conversely, a significant increase in CV values would indicate that firms became more 
dissimilar in their disclosure behavior.  
 
  The results in Table 4 indicate that, for the homogeneous sample, the CV statistic 
decreased for all categories of disclosure except “Background Information”. For the 
heterogeneous sample, Table 4 shows that the calculated CV decreased for the 
“Summary,” “Non-financial,”  “projection” and “MDA” categories of information. The 
CV statistic increased in the case of Background Information. However, tests of statistical 
significance indicate that the reported differences in CV values are, by and large, 
statistically insignificant. Specifically, only the CVs for the Summary Disclosure 
category in the case of the homogeneous sample are significantly different at the .05 level 
(using an F-test).TP
29
PT Hence, we are led to conclude that there has essentially been no 
significant convergence or divergence of disclosure preferences on the part of 
international companies across our sample of Japanese firms. The broad inference one   19
might draw from this result is that the information demands of the constituents of 
Japanese companies became neither more nor less distinct over time. Thus, while 
constituents, on average, demanded more information from companies, the nature of the 
information did not converge in similarity. 
 
  As noted above, a convergence or divergence of firm sizes over our sample period 
could contribute to convergence or divergence of disclosure practices. In this case, a 
failure to observe a statistically significant change in disclosure might reflect changes in 
firm-size distributions that offset the influence of changes in capital market conditions. In 
fact, F-tests allow us to accept the hypothesis that the coefficients of variation for two 
measures of firm size, total assets and the natural log value of total assets, are equal when 
comparing the two sample years. Hence, the failure to observe either increased or 
decreased harmonization of disclosure over our sample period does not appear to be a 
statistical artifact associated with diverging (or converging) firm size distributions over 
the same period. 
 
SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
  Our analysis shows that the voluntary disclosure practices of Japanese firms did 
not converge or diverge over the time period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. This 
finding suggests that Japanese firms have distinctive clienteles for information and that 
there has been no significant convergence in demand patterns for information across 
those clienteles. The observed constancy in the nature of information disclosure spans a 
period of time in which our sample was disclosing more overall information, presumably 
in response to market pressure for more information.  
 
For reasons discussed earlier, we believe that Japanese companies provide a 
useful focus for studying the possible convergence of disclosure preferences on the part 
of international companies. In particular, market pressures on Japanese companies to 
supply their clienteles with information deemed useful by the latter arguably increased 
substantially over the sample period. The fact that convergence in disclosure practice did 
not occur in a relatively homogeneous sample of firms suggests that pressures for   20
convergence are even weaker among more heterogeneous multinational companies 
headquartered in different countries.  
 
To the extent that our findings can be generalized beyond our sample of Japanese 
companies, they call into question the wisdom of international accounting standards 
bodies demanding greater uniformity of corporate disclosure practices.TP
30
PT Specifically, our 
results suggest that competitive pressures will compel firms to disclose voluntarily more 
accounting information to the marketplace. However, the constituencies for such 
information vary across different types of firms such that groups of firms will find it 
advantageous to disclose different types of information. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that those constituencies are becoming more similar over time in their disclosure 
priorities. Enforced uniformity might therefore lead to increased disclosure of certain 
types of information for many firms where the full private costs of disclosure exceed the 
associated private benefits. Regulatory and standards boards should therefore proceed 
cautiously in their efforts to promote harmonized de jure disclosure regimes, both 
domestically and (especially) internationally.   21
Appendix 1 
Disclosure Index Scoring Sheet  
Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Christine A. Botosan 
(The Accounting Review, Volume 72, No. 3, July 1997) 
Company Name: 
Report Type: Annual report/10-k/Summary annual report 
Year end: 
Background Information:  Qual.  Quan. 
a. A statement of corporate goals or objectives is     
provided.    
b. A general statement of corporate strategy is provided.     
c. Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate     
goal are discussed.     
d. Planned actions to be taken in future years are     
discussed.    
e. A time frame for achieving corporate goals is     
provided.    
f. Barriers to entry are discussed.     
g. Impact of barriers to entry on current profits is     
discussed.    
h. Impact of barriers to entry on future profits is     
discussed.    
i. The competitive environment is discussed.     
j. The impact of competition on current profits is     
discussed.    
k. The impact of competition on future profits is     
discussed.    
1. A general description of the business is provided.     
m. The principal products produced are identified.     
n. Specific characteristics of these products are described.     
o. The principal markets are identified.     
specific characteristics of these markets are described.     
Summary of historical results:  10 or  Fewer 
than 
 more  10 
 years  years 
a. Return-on-assets or sufficient information to     
compute return-on-assets (i.e. net income, tax rate,     
interest expense and total assets is provided.     
b. Net profit margin or sufficient information to     
compute net profit margin (i.e. net income, tax rate,     
interest expense and sales is s provided,     
c. Asset turnover or sufficient information to compute     
asset turnover (i.e. sales and total assets) is provided.     
d. Return-on-equity or sufficient information to       22
compute return-on-equity (i.e. net income and     
stockholders equity) is provided.     
  Yes No 
e. A summary of sales and net income for at least the 
most recent eight quarters is provided. 
  
Key non-financial statistics:  Amount 
a. Number of employees,   
b. Average compensation per employee.   
c. Order backlog .   
d. Percentage of order backlog to be shipped next ear.   
e. Percentage of sales in products designed in the last 
five ears. 
 
f. Market share.   
g. Dollar amount of new orders laced this ear.   
h. Units sold.   
i. Unit selling rice.   
j. Growth in units sold.   
k. Rejection/defect rates.   
1. Production lead time.   
m. Age of key employees.   
n. Sales growth in key regions not reported as 
geographic segments. 
 
o. break-even sales $'s   
p. volume of materials consumed   
q. prices of materials consumed   
r. ratio of inputs to outputs   
s. average age of key employees   
t. growth in sales of key products not reported as product 
segments 
 







a. A comparison of previous earnings projections to 
actual earnings is provided. 
  
b. A comparison of previous sales projections to actual 
sales is provided. 
  
c. The impact of opportunities available to the firm on 
future sales or profits is discussed. 
  
d. The impact of risks facing the firm on future sales or 
profits is discussed. 
  
e. A forecast of market share is provided.     
f. A cash flow projection is provided.     
g. A projection of ca ital expenditures or R&D is provided.     






h. A projection of future profits is provided.   
i. A projection of future sales is provided.   
Management discussion and analysis: 








a. Change in sales.       
b. Change in operating income.       





c. Change in cost of goods sold.       
d. Change in cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales.       
e. Change in gross profit.       
f. Change in gross profit as a percentage of sales.      
g. Change in selling and administrative expenses.       
h. Change in interest or interest income.       
i. Change in net income.       
j. Change in inventory       
k. Change in accounts receivable.       
1. Change in capital expenditures or R&D.       
m. Change in market share.       
 





Summary of Sample Firms  
 
      U Time  Period    
      U96-98U     U87-93 
       
Firms  in  Nikkei  Index     225    225 
Less firms in regulated, specialized 
  or  service related      U  78U     U  78U 
Available  for  selection   147    147 
English language annual report 
  not issued or incomplete    U  38U     U  99U     
 
Total firms selected for heterogeneous 
s a m p l e       U109*U     U  48* 
 
 




Descriptive Statistics by Disclosure Category 
Homogeneous Sample (n = 41) 
 
U‘Current’  Time  Period  (96-98)          
     U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
Maximum Possible 
Score   U   26  U  U    7  U  U   40  U  U   28  U  U26U  U127U 
 
Mean Disclosure 
Score       10.2        3.7       4.1        3.8      9.1  30.8 
        
Standard 
Deviation      2.3        1.4       2.4        2.9      4.8    9.3 
     
Coefficient 
of Variation     
(x 100)     22.7       39.1     59.2      76.3     53.4  30.3 
 
             
 
U‘Bubble’  Time  Period  (87-93)          
     U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
Maximum Possible 
Score   U   26  U  U    7  U  U   40  U  U   28  U  U26U  U127U 
 
Mean Disclosure 
Score     8.1   2.7   3.5   1.8   6.6  22.7 
         
Standard 
Deviation  1.6   1.4   2.2   1.7   4.2 7.0 
       
Coefficient 
of Variation   
(x  100)   20.2   53.7   62.1   94.9   62.9  31.0 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Disclosure Category 
Heterogeneous Sample  
 
U‘Current’ Time Period (96-98)  n = 109               
     U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
Maximum Possible 
Score   U   26  U  U    7  U  U   40  U  U   28  U  U26U  U127U 
 
Mean Disclosure 
Score       10.1        2.9       4.0        3.5     8.4  28.9 
        
Standard 
Deviation      2.4        1.5       2.4        3.2      4.5    10.0 
     
Coefficient 
of Variation     
(x 100)     24.2       50.1     61.1      91.3     53.4  34.6 
 
 
             
 
 
U‘Bubble’ Time Period (87-93)    n  =  48______        
     U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
Maximum Possible 
Score   U   26  U  U    7  U  U   40  U  U   28  U  U26U  U127U 
 
Mean Disclosure 
Score   7.9   2.6   3.5   1.6   6.5  22.2 
         
Standard 
Deviation  1.7   1.5   2.2   1.7   4.1 7.1 
       
Coefficient 
of Variation   
(x  100)   21.5   55.5   64.3   102.2   62.1  31.8 




Summary of Results 
 
UHomogeneous  Sample  (n  =  41)          
 
U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
 
Coefficient 
of Variation     
(x 100)     
Current   22.7       39.1     59.2      76.3     53.4  30.3 
Bubble    20.2       53.7     62.1       94.9     62.9  31.0 
 
Direction (1)     D         C       C       C       C     C 
 
 
             
 
 
UHeterogeneous  Sample  (n  =  109,  48)         
 
U  Disclosure  Category       
  Background    Non-    
  UInformationU  USummaryU  UfinancialU  UProjectionU  UMDAU  UTotal 
 
Coefficient 
of Variation     
(x 100)     
Current     24.2       50.1     61.1      91.3     53.4  34.6 
Bubble      21.5       55.5     64.3    102.2     62.1  31.8 
 




C = Convergence, evidence of more harmonization of disclosure over the time  
       period. 
  D = Divergence, more variation in disclosure over the time period. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
TP
1
PT This is obviously a general problem in trade and investment harmonization initiatives. For example, the 
developed countries in the WTO have a different perspective on appropriate member standards for labor 
practices than do the developing countries.  A skeptical assessment of whether national governments will 
ever come to an agreement on global accounting standards is provided in Bryan-Low (2003) 
TP
2
PT Evidence on this point is provided in Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993), Barth and Clinch (1996), and 
Parker and Morris (2001). 
TP
3
PT Gray, Radebaugh and Roberts (1990) provide evidence that financial executives in U.S. and U.K. 
multinationals differ significantly in their perceptions of the net costs or net benefits of individual items of 




PT To the extent that the choice of disclosure practice is voluntary, many firms may simply avoid adopting 
the recommended international standard if it departed significantly from the standard that the firm believed 
was optimal for its own constituencies. Collett, Godfrey and Hrasky (2001) explicitly question whether the 
benefits of international harmonization exceed the associated costs. They also argue that global 
harmonization of accounting is arguably the most challenging and controversial issue currently confronting 
accounting standard setters and market regulators. 
TP
5
PT A review of a number of such studies is provided in Tay and Parker (1990). 
TP
6
PT In this regard, see Aitken and Islam (1984) and Cooke and Wallace (1990). 
TP
7
PT See, for example, Frost and Kinney, Jr. (1996) and Parker and Morris (2001). 
TP
8
PT Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) consider the degree to which U.S., U.K. and European multinational 
companies disclose accounting information in excess of regulatory requirements. However, they do not 




PT See, for example, Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995). Singleton and Globerman (2002) reference other 
relevant studies and also document increasing financial disclosure in Japan in the 1990s. 
TP
10
PT Evidence supporting this assertion is provided in Singleton and Globerman (2002). 
TP
11
PT An extensive typology of disclosure-related terminology is provided in Tay and Parker (1990). 
TP
12
PT Parker and Morris (2001) would classify this latter change as spontaneous harmonization. 
TP
13




PT See, for example, VanDer Tas (1992). 
TP
15
PT For convenience, we refer to this as the “current” period. 
TP
16
PT The growing reliance on foreign sources of capital continues to the present. See, for example, Singer 
(2002).   32
                                                                                                                                                 
TP
17
PT Partitioned time periods to analyze disclosure behavior have been used in other studies. For example, 
Sengupta (1989) adopts this procedure to assess the impacts of disclosure on a firm’s cost-of-capital. 
TP
18
PT See, for example, Cooke (1991), Cooke (1992), Frost and Pownall (1994a), Gray, Meek and Roberts 
(1995), Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998). Also, Marston and Shrives (1991) provide an extensive analysis 
and discussion of the limitations and use of disclosure indices. 
TP
19
PT The points and scores assigned treat each disclosure item equally, i.e. they are unweighted. However, 
since there are more disclosure items for some categories of information than for others, Botosan’s (1997) 
instrument implicitly weights information categories differently. 
TP
20
PT Additional details on the estimation of the index values will be provided upon request. 
TP
21
PT Sample sizes for related studies are as follows: Cooke (1991) – 48; Cooke (1992) – 35: Frost and 
Pownall (1994b) – 93; Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995) –116 U.S., 64 U.K.; Botosan (1997) – 122; 
Sengupta (1998) – 103. 
TP
22
PT  Note, the heterogeneous sample includes the 41 firms comprising the homogeneous sample.  
TP
23
PT Other studies also identify the relevance of firm size and listing status to disclosure behavior, albeit 
without a specific focus on voluntary disclosure. See, for example, Meek and Saudagaran (1990), Cooke 
(1991), Choi and Levich (1991) and Ashbaugh (2001). 
TP
24
PT For additional evidence on the impact of industry classification on disclosure, see Cooke (1992), Botosan 
(1997) and Sengupta (1998). 
TP
25




PT Using a chi-square test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the industrial distribution of the sample firms 
in 1987 is identical to the industrial distribution in 1998. 
TP
27
PT These characteristics are discussed in Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) and Cooke (1996). 
TP
28
PT  This interpretation is consistent with findings reported in Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995). 
TP
29
PT The test is described in Freund and Walpole (1980). 
TP
30
PT This caution has also been raised in Ashbaugh (2001), and Collett, Godfrey and Hrasky (2001).  